Important letter signed ( Go: Washington ) 3 pages (9 x 7.5 in.; 229 x 191 mm). Head Quarters New Windsor, 28 May 1781, to Brigadier General James Clinton, father of Dewitt Clinton, and brother of George Clinton, Revolutionary governor of New York; in fine condition
In the final stages of the war and with limited military intelligence, Washington gambles that the British will refrain from advancing on the New York frontier, concentrating the bulk of his force on the lower Hudson in an attempt to take Manhattan. At the time of the present letter, Clinton was in command of the Northern Department, headquartered at Albany. Answering a pair of anxious requests from Clinton for reinforcements in the north, Washington writes in full:
Upon my return from Wethersfield the evening of the 26th [the historic Wethersfield Conference between Washington and Rochambeau, May 22, 1781, where the grand invasion of Manhattan was conceived] I was favored with your two Letters of the 17th and 22nd Inst.
General St Clair had previously given some directions respecting the Military Stores which were wanted at the Northward. I have since referred the application to General Knox, who has made such farther arrangements for a supply, as our present circumstances would permit. In consequence of the determination to abandon Fort Schuyler, I have also thought it advisable to send an Engineer to have the superintendance and direction of the Fortifications which are to be erected, General Du Portail has been requested to order one accordingly.
The Six Companies of Col Van Schaicks Regiment, now at West Point, are put under marching Orders, that if occasion should require they might be transported to Albany immediately. But I am very unwilling to suffer any Troops to be removed from this quarter, unless there is a real necessity for it. And indeed it would be useless to send them, unless there is also a probability of their being supplied with Provisions.
Altho I am apprehensive the Enemy will attempt to make incursions on the frontier in the course of the Campaign, the accounts as yet have been so vague and contradictory, that I know not what to believe respecting the present strength, disposition, and designs, of the British and Savages in Canada. As soon, and as frequently as you can obtain any intelligence that may be relied upon, I wish you to advise me of it. And also of everything of moment, which appertains to the Troops under your Command, particularly of the state of your Supplies.
The month of May was a busy one for Washington, for it brought the prospect of a new, decisive campaign against the British. Previously, his ragged troops just 3,500 strong, had effected a hollow siege of New York, then occupied by the British under Henry Clinton. Lacking provisions and ammunition, they were relegated to a watchful poise across the Hudson while the confident British troops, 14,500 in number and professionally trained, reinforced their works on Manhattan.
On 22 May, just six days before the date of the present letter, Washington received encouraging news: the French West Indian fleet had been ordered to send a major detachment northward to America, scheduled to arrive in July. In addition,the French government had appropriated 6 million livres to the United States for sorely needed military supplies, chiefly food and clothing. All this was an enormous vote of confidence in Washington, and enabled him to plan for an offensive move against New York instead of remaining in a defensive siege throughout the summer.
A hasty meeting with Rochambeau was arranged [the Wethersfield Conference], the fruits of which were an elaborate plan to wrest control of New York from the British with a combined force of French and American troops, involving General James Clinton s Newport-based troop [near present-day Elmira, New York], which would be moved to the south. This proved a dangerous endeavor: by concentrating his forces for an attack on well-defended New York, Washington left the frontier of upstate New York frighteningly exposed to invasion. Yet, with the bulk of the British military presence firmly ensconced in New York City, it was a gamble he had to take if had any chance of winning the war.
By the end of July, Washington had mustered a combined force of over 9,000 men, ready and in position to sweep over Manhattan Island. But weeks of reconnaissance during July and August revealed Washington s worst fears: the British works were virtually impregnable. Furthermore, De Grasse, the French admiral who had triumphantly sailed north to aid the Continentals, announced that he would withdraw from New York by October at the latest. Washington, who had been so focused on the capture of New York, was initially incensed at this setback; but after careful consideration he devised an alternate plan to leave a garrison of 2,500 men on the Hudson while secretly moving the majority of his bolstered army southward in an attempt to bottle up Cornwallis at Yorktown. If successful, this would prove to be the final crushing blow to the British war effort in America, ensuring the freedom and independence for America he had fought so long to achieve.
A fine letter with important military content, written at climactic juncture during the Revolutionary War. The removal of troops from the northern theater was the very first step in what would become the last campaign of the war: the siege and ultimate surrender of the British at Yorktown.
Includes a full LOA from PSA/DNA.